Nottingham, McKinney named as habeas corpus lockdown litigants

Name suppression has lapsed for the lay litigants who alleged that the New Zealand Government’s response to COVID-19 has subjected them to unlawful detention in a Habeas Corpus writ that failed in both the High Court and Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal judgment  names them as DERMOT GREGORY NOTTINGHAM and ROBERT EARLE MCKINNEY (changed from A and B).

This isn’t a surprise to me for various reasons. Both Nottingham and McKinney (usually with Nottingham as the named litigant) have been mostly unsuccessful in many court proceedings over the past decade.

Nottingham and McKinney worked with each other as real estate agents and also in the company Advantage Advocacy Limited (now in liquidation), and jointly tried to prosecute myself and Allied Press Limited (charges withdrawn after 11 months of legal proceedings and also tried to prosecute APN Limited and Lynn Prentice on similar charges (dismissed at trial).  Both also unsuccessfully opposed costs being awarded through multiple court proceedings.

One of the worst examples is summarised in Nottingham v Real Estate Agents Authority (CAC 10057) [2019] NZREADT 53 (26 November 2019) – this dates back to a business dispute beginning in 2009 and court proceedings starting in 2011, and I don’t know if it is over yet.  The judgment details just some of a litany of woeful litigation, and is summarised:

The abuse of process which the instant case exemplifies is the initiation of proceedings in a court of justice for the purpose of mounting a collateral attack upon a final decision against the intending plaintiff which has been made by another court of competent jurisdiction in previous proceedings in which the intending plaintiff had a full opportunity of contesting the decision in the court by which it was made.

We find that it would be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the Tribunal’s processes to repeat the re-consideration and consideration directed by Justice Thomas, and already undertaken by Judge Paul, whose findings were upheld in the High Court. As a result of that process, the appellants’ appeals can properly be described as “meritless”.

There’s other judgments that make similar findings.

That saga included a private prosecution that resulted in a scheduled 3 day trial taking 17 days and failing. As a result substantial costs were awarded against Nottingham, which led to him being adjudicated bankrupt in 2018 (I was one of a number of creditors owed unpaid costs awarded against Nottingham). McKinney featured in the bankruptcy proceedings, claiming Nottingham owed him hundreds of thousands of dollars, but that appears to be a part of a failed attempt to avoid bankruptcy.

Bankruptcy judgment due to unpaid court awarded costs:  HONEY v NOTTINGHAM [2018] NZHC 2382 [11 September 2018]

Also in 2018 Nottingham was found guilty of two charges of name suppression breaches and five charges of criminal harassment, and sentenced to home detention. He failed in an appeal against convictions and sentence and the Crown succeeded in having his sentence extended. Nottingham very narrowly avoided a prison sentence, but is currently appealing the home detention (ironically if he wins that case he risks having tio serve some of his sentence in prison because that was the alternative outcome).

In this trial Nottingham was found to have been the main person responsibl;e for the notorious Lauda Finem website:

Either Dermot Nottingham is Lauda Finem (in other words, the leading mind of that blog) or he is so intimately related to it that it is proper to conclude that he provided information and draft articles to that blog site knowing and intending that they would be published.”

“He makes the concession…that he has never denied that he has supplied information to the website…”

See “Either Dermot Nottingham is Lauda Finem…or he is so intimately related to it…”

Nottingham also tried to appeal his sentence via Habeas Corpus and failed last month – see Nottingham v R [2020] NZSC 39 (24 April 2020).

He was released from home detention on bail last month pending a Supreme Court hearing later this month (currently rescheduled to 28 May).

In a separate proceeding Nottingham failed getting leave to appeal last month: Nottingham v Maltese Cat Limited [2020] NZSC 36 (17 April 2020)

There is also nothing in the various factual matters raised by Mr Nottingham that would justify a grant of leave.

It was reported on Thursday Duo who sued PM now ask for judicial review of Govt’s pandemic decisions

Two men who sued Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern by claiming unlawful detention during the Covid-19 lockdown are now asking for a judge to test the legality of the Government’s pandemic decisions.

The two men, who had their habeas corpus (unlawful detention) claims dismissed by the Court of Appeal last week, allege Ardern, Bloomfield, Director of Civil Defence and Emergency Management Sarah Stuart-Black, and the Commissioner of Police made orders “were no medical grounds of sufficient cogency to impose the lockdown”, documents filed with the High Court read.

The High Court confirmed it had received the application from the men for a judicial review yesterday, but it was yet to be processed.

There was good reason I commented at the time that I hope the court requires security for costs, due to Nottingham and McKinney’s high failure rate and failure to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars in costs in various failed proceedings.

With another person, Andrew Borrowdale, having a judicial review proceeding already before the court there must be low to no public interest in Nottingham and McKinney being able to  waste more court time without at least fronting up with security in advance.

From my experience, while Nottingham has put his name to most of their legal proceedings, McKinney has been almost as responsible for extensive harassment via legal proceedings.

Habeas Corpus lockdown appeal by A and B dismissed

A and B failed in the High Court of their claim of habeas corpus illegal detention under Covid-19 lockdowns. The Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal and has ruled that interim name suppression is not appropriate – but have extended suppression until 4 pm Friday to allow for a possible Supreme Court appeal.

The respondents were named as JACINDA ARDERN, ASHLEY BLOOMFIELD AND SARAH STUARTBLACK but the Court advised:

A and B have referred to the respondents in person. In doing so, A has engaged in political comments of a personalised nature, particularly against the Prime Minister. Respondents in applications for habeas corpus should be referred to by the office they hold or by naming the Attorney-General as the respondent. If the matter proceeds further, that correction should be made by A and B.

So using the Court to engage in political attacks is not appropriate.

A and B also tried to represent others but lay litigants can’t do that.

A and B chose not to be represented by a lawyer. A purported however, to represent himself and unnamed members of his family. B purported to bring his application on behalf of his fellow “bubble” members. A’s family and B’s “bubble” members are not parties to their respective proceedings and A and B cannot represent them. We will therefore treat each appellant’s proceeding as being limited to the appellant alone.

They claimed to be detained but admitted some freedom of movement.

For example, they were free to exercise, go to a supermarket, talk to anyone and access the internet.

Subject to A’s [redacted], he and B can continue to communicate with whomsoever they wish, and they may continue to have unrestricted access to the internet. They have taken advantage of many of these opportunities.

The restrictions on movement imposed by the COVD-19 Alert Level 3 order do not involve restrictions upon the liberty of A and B as Parliament intended liberty to be understood in the Act. A and B have not therefore been detained for the purposes of the Act.

There are legal issues but they haven’t been appropriately raised with this action.

As has been noted by the Regulations Review Committee and two of New Zealand’s leading public law academics,29 there are unresolved questions about the lawfulness of the notices issued under s 70 of the Health Act.

Those questions, cannot, however, be appropriately addressed in the context of an application for habeas corpus. Our reasons for this conclusion are:

(a) The questions raise complex legal issues that are not amenable to the truncated procedures prescribed in the Act.

(b) If unsuccessful, the Crown has no right concerning the lawfulness of the notices issued under s 70 of
the Health Act were answered against the Crown.

(c) An expedited application for judicial review seeking declarations in the High Court is the only appropriate procedure in the circumstances of this case.

(d) Applications for habeas corpus should not be entertained in circumstances where they are really being used as a substitute for judicial review.

Even if A and B are detained we would, if it were necessary to do so, decline to issue a writ of habeas corpus without requiring the Crown to justify the legality of their detention because habeas corpus is not the appropriate procedure for considering their allegations.

So it was a misconceived attempt to claim illegal detention.

A and B also failed again on name suppression:

A and B have also appealed the decision of Peters J declining their applications for name suppression. Orders were made in the High Court to continue interim name suppression for 20 working days following the High Court’s judgment, subject to further order of the Court. Before us, A and B sought interim name suppression for six months. This is because they say they are concerned about their safety, and in the case of A, the safety of his family. They claim they are likely to be subject to physical danger from other New Zealanders, who may take issue with their challenge to the lawfulness of the Government’s measures to combat the risks of the COVID-19 virus.

On that basis anyone initiating court proceedings could claim possible future attacks. But that’s obvious nonsense.

The starting point is the application of the principle of open justice, which normally requires parties in civil proceedings to be identified.

There are, however, circumstances in which the principle of open justice should yield to a party’s concerns in order to ensure justice is achieved in individual cases.

The present case, is however, far removed from the types of circumstance which justify departure from the principle of open justice.

There is no factual basis upon which we can conclude that A, his family, or B will suffer physical harm if the public knows they are the individuals who have initiated these proceedings. It is possible they may receive some unwelcome comments and that they may be upset by what others have to say. Those are, however, not proper grounds for granting them name suppression, even on an interim basis.

In effect they seem to want to protect themselves from ridicule for a fairly ridiculous attempt to attack the Prime Minister through the courts, and to not be restricted from doing whatever they like under lockdown.

The appeals are dismissed.

Order continuing interim name suppression until 4.00 pm on 8 May 2020 or such other date as may be ordered by the Supreme Court.

My guess is they will try to take both the habeas corpus claim and name suppression as far as they can. Maybe they will argue at the Supreme Court that more wasting of court time risks even more unwelcome comments.

No order for costs – not sure why as that is one of the few ways of deterring time wasting lay litigants.

Judgment: A v Ardern

Court of Appeal rejects habeas corpus lockdown arguments but “questions needed answers”

The Court of Appeal has ruled out an appeal by two mean claiming they were detained under lockdown, saying the men had gone about it the wrong way, but suggested “extraordinarily complex questions needed answers” and could be dealt via urgent hearings .

On 17 April the High Court rejected two writs for habeas corpus, finding that two associated persons were not detained illegally under the Covid-19 Level 4 lockdown. See:

On Friday the Court of Appeal also found that the two men, now in Level 3 lockdown, did not amount to detention.

My guess is that the two applicants are not up to dealing with extraordinarily complex legal questions. It didn’t help that they included lame political arguments, like the lockdown was put in place to help Jacinda Ardern’s re-election.

Stuff:  Lockdown legal appeal gains traction

That headline is odd – it isn’t yet clear how the appeal may get traction.

Two people who sued Jacinda Ardern, claiming the coronavirus lockdown was an illegal detention, have lost their case but gained support for their concerns about the legal basis for the lockdown.

The Court of Appeal on Friday decided the men’s circumstances now, in lockdown level 3, did not amount to detention.

But the three judges said the case had raised issues that that could be examined in separate proceedings, perhaps in an urgent hearing.

The two laymen arguing the case had gone about it the wrong way, the court said.

The pair used an ancient legal process called habeas corpus to challenge what was alleged was an unlawful detention.

What the two men were really trying to do was challenge the reasons for making the lockdown order, and habeas corpus wasn’t the right process to do that, the judge said.

Success would have meant the entire population would have been released from the restrictions.

A finding of no legal restrictions could have a very risky impact on dealing with Covid-19, and I would expect the Government to try to urgently find a legal way to continue some restrictions.

President of the Court of Appeal, Justice Stephen Kos, said extraordinarily complex questions needed answers. He referred to an article academics Andrew Geddis and Claudia Geiringer wrote on The Spinoff and a report of Parliament’s regulations review committee looking at government powers in emergencies, which he said was “hardly approving”.

The two laymen arguing the case had gone about it the wrong way, the court said. Its full reasons are expected next week.

…the three judges said the case had raised issues that that could be examined in separate proceedings, perhaps in an urgent hearing.

Perhaps the court’s full reasons will explain how the questions can be dealt with from here.


Some more detail from NZ Herald: Duo’s appeal dismissed in lawsuit against Jacinda Ardern over lockdown ‘detention’

Court of Appeal president Justice Stephen Kós quizzed both men on whether they were able to exercise outside and visit a supermarket, which they had, before making an oral ruling on behalf of himself, Justice Christine French and Justice David Collins.

He said the panel of judges were satisfied “that in the circumstances they are not detained for the purposes of the Habeas Corpus Act 2001”.

“This is the case which the lawfulness of the Crown’s actions call to be determined not in a habeas corpus matter but more appropriately in the context of a judicial review proceeding in the High Court,” Justice Kós said.

The conclusions of the Court of Appeal, the judge added, were also without prejudice in the determination of the lawfulness of the Crown’s actions in any potential judicial review.

During their case, A and B have made claims that modelling predicting up to 80,000 Kiwi deaths and the growing economic cost, when compared with the relatively low number of Covid-19 related deaths, was part of wider political conspiracy.

“The Prime Minister made the wrong decision … all for her political gain,” one of the men said in the High Court.

It was also alleged Ardern had conspired with Sir Stephen Tindall to ruin the economy and the United Nations Secretary-General should have been consulted.

The High Court judge who originally rejected their writ also said that a judicial review was the correct legal process to challenge the lockdown restrictions.

Justice Kós also dismissed the two men’s bids for continued name suppression, saying the public has a right to know who sued the Prime Minister.

He extended the current suppression order until next Friday to allow the men, known only as A and B, to seek leave to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court.

It could become farcical if people could anonymously sue the Prime Minister.

Another habeas corpus writ over lockdown dismissed

Alongside the dismissal of a habeas corpus writ over claimed illegal detention under the Covid-19 lockdown – see Failures with habeas corpus writ against Ardern et al over lockdown ‘detention’ – an associate of failed Applicant ‘A’ has similarly failed for much the same reasons, except that ‘B’ was not currently serving a home detention sentence.

The respondents have established that any detention to which B is subject to under the order is lawful.

B is not subject to detention within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act 2001. If I am wrong, and B is detained, the detention is lawful.

‘B’ he also applied for permanent name suppression on similar grounds.

B seeks an order for permanent suppression of the publication of his name and other identifying details. The gist of B’s submissions (oral and written) were that, although he brings this application for himself, the implications for the wider community mean it will attract publicity and attention. Some people in the community will favour the application and underlying thrust of the argument, being that the order was unlawful because it was unnecessary, and some will not. In all of this, B’s identity does not much matter, and he prefers not to be named.

B also advised me that he has been the subject of death and other threats since becoming associated with A and, although he has advised the police of these, he is concerned there may be a repeat.

I decline to grant B name suppression on the basis of the death threats of which he informed me. B was not on oath when he told me of these matters and nor is there any evidence of a link between the mere fact of publication of his name, in connection with any legal proceeding, and the making of any such threat. Even if such were established, it is for the police to investigate any threat to B, rather than for the Court to prohibit disclosure.

B’s other submissions, which were consistent with Mr Powell’s point that B’s application might be considered “public interest” litigation, are more persuasive. I accept B’s identity does not particularly matter to any media report of his application. What is important is that an application for habeas corpus has been made in respect of
an order affecting the entire population, and the grounds on which the application has been made.

However, neither Mr Powell nor B referred me to any authority or made any submissions addressing how suppression for these reasons could be reconciled with the authorities cited above. I may have been able to take this point further had they done so. Absent that, however, I decline to make the order for permanent name suppression sought.

Claims with no evidence and no supporting arguments.

B advised me he would wish to appeal any refusal of name suppression. At the end of the hearing, I made an order for interim suppression pending further order of the Court. I continue that order, again subject to further order of the Court, for 20 working days from the date of this judgment to enable B to pursue an appeal if he wishes.

That’s standard and the same as for ‘A’.

So why would two associates make two near identical applications to the court? Both seem to have been poorly argued.

And both applied for permanent name suppression without citing authorities or evidence.

While the legalities of lockdown requirements warrant being tested this dual attempt seems to have been a waste of court time, with more time to be spent on the two appeals on name suppression.

I think there is public interest in knowing who these lame litigants are.

Judgment: B v Ardern [2020] NZHC 814 (24 April 2020)

The associated judgment: A v Ardern [2020] NZHC 796 (23 April 2020)

Failures with habeas corpus writ against Ardern et al over lockdown ‘detention’

Last Friday an application was heard in the High Court where two men were seeking a writ of habeas corpus against The Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern claiming they were being illegally detained through the Covid-19 lockdown. Yesterday Judge Peters J delivered her judgment that shows multiple failures in the action.

  • An application to transfer the case to be heard by a full Court of five Judges in the Court of Appeal was declined.
  • A and his family are not subject to detention within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act 2001.
  • If A and his family are detained, the detention is lawful.
  • Application for name suppression based on vague possibilities, declined but extended pending appeal

One of the men, who has interim name suppression and was described as A, appeared in person as the Applicant. He is currently serving a term of home detention unrelated to the pandemic.

Respondents were names as JACINDA ARDERN, ASHLEY BLOOMFIELD AND SARAH STUARTBLACK (represented by Mr Powell).

A, the applicant, submits the terms of order subject him and his family to “detention” within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act 2001 (“Act”). By application of 14 April 2020, A challenges the legality of the detention he alleges and
seeks a writ of habeas corpus, for himself, his partner and two other members of his family. The effect of the issue of the writ would be to release A and his family from the restrictions imposed by the order.

But presumably it wouldn’t release A from home detention.

Transfer to the Court of Appeal

A sought an order transferring his application to the Court of Appeal, ideally to be heard by a full Court of five Judges. A submitted the significance of his application made this an appropriate course.

I declined A’s application. Any decision to transfer a proceeding from the High Court to the Court of Appeal is one for the Court of Appeal, not the High Court.

So that application was pointless in the High Court. And the significance of the application is the poor arguments made.

A’s application raises two issues. The first is whether the terms of the order effect a detention within the meaning of the Act. If so, the second issue is whether the respondents can establish the legality of the detention. If not, I must order A’s and his family’s release.

Detention

The Act defines “detention” as:
detention includes every form of restraint of liberty of the person

A submitted the terms of the order subject him and his family to detention. This is because they may not leave their house for whatever purpose they wish, such as to swim, hunt or tramp, or to travel as they see fit etc, but only for essential personal movement.

In this case, the effect of the order is to limit the purposes for which A and his family may leave their home, and it also limits some forms of interaction with friends and other family.

But, as the respondents submit, A and his family remain free to engage in many of their usual activities. In my view, the freedom to exercise whenever they wish, to go to the supermarket whenever they wish, to talk to whomever they wish, and to access the internet whenever they wish is quite different from being “held in close custody”, which the Court of Appeal said in Drever is required for detention. A greater degree of control of the time and place of movement and/or association would be required.

… I do not consider A and his family are detained within the meaning of the Act by the terms of the order.

Lawfulness

If I am wrong in this, it becomes necessary to consider the lawfulness of the detention.

The order was made pursuant to s 70(1)(f) of the Health Act 1956 (“Health Act”)…

The medical officer of health may make an order under s 70:

(a) for the purpose of preventing the outbreak or spread of any infectious disease; and
(b) if, amongst other things, a state of emergency has been declared or an epidemic notice is in force.

Mr Powell submits, and I accept, these requirements were met in the present case…

Although A did not dispute the pre-requisites in s 70(1) for the making of the order were met — his argument as to the lawfulness of the order being quite different — A did raise a point as to whether s 70(1)(f) permits the Director-General to require everyone in New Zealand to be isolated by staying at home. On this point, A’s submission on the text of s 70(1)(f) was that “persons, places, buildings …” connotes smaller, confined groups of persons, not the entire population.

In response, Mr Powell submitted the word “persons” in s 70(1)(f) is sufficiently broad to cover “all persons within all districts of New Zealand”, being the ambit of the order.

I accept the orders that may be made under s 70(1) are very broad.

As I have said, however, A’s argument as to the proper construction of s 70(1)(f) was not his main submission on the issue of legality. Rather, A submitted the order was unlawful on numerous, quite different grounds.

A submitted the order constituted a gross breach of all New Zealanders’ human rights and “fundamental inalienable freedoms”, such as those conferred by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Act, that, as a matter of principle, it could never be lawful.

A also submitted the order was unlawful because it was “unreasonable”, in the sense there was insufficient evidence to warrant its making in the first instance. He also submitted the evidence that now exists — and which he believes was or might have been foretold — as to hospitalisation and death rates, the sector of the population most likely to be adversely affected (the elderly), and the effects of the “lockdown” on the New Zealand economy render the continuation of the order unlawful, even if its making was lawful, which he refutes.

A also submitted the order was not made for a proper purpose, namely to control the spread of the disease, but for many other extraneous reasons, including to enhance Ms Ardern’s prospects of re-election.

Kiwiblog comments type arguments don’t fit well with a court of law.

I accept the respondents have established any detention effected by the order is lawful, for the reasons in [31] and [35] above. I am also satisfied the arguments A relies on are not suitable for determination on an application for a writ of habeas corpus.

In fact, s 14(1A) of the Act permits the Court to refuse an application for the issue of the writ if satisfied the application is not the appropriate procedure for considering an applicant’s allegations. This is such a case. The appropriate procedure is an application for judicial review.

So a writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate way to try to deal with this. I hope ‘A’ does not take the court’s suggestion of the appropriate procedure as a signal to try another approach in another action.

…the habeas corpus procedure is not suitable for the arguments A wishes to pursue. His arguments do not go to the lawfulness of any detention but the underlying decision to make the order, which is a different issue.

A and his family are not subject to detention within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act 2001. If I am wrong, and A and his family are detained, the detention is lawful.

Name suppression

A seeks an order for permanent suppression of the publication of his name and other identifying details. A perceives that, in the past, publication of his name in connection with other legal proceedings in which he has been involved has led to death threats against him, and threats to harm him and his family. These threats are distressing to A and his family, and exacerbate serious health conditions affecting all concerned.

Serious health conditions that may make ‘A’ a high risk with Covid-19.

As to why publication of his name in connection with this proceeding would be likely to lead to further threats, A said this has been the general consequence of publication of his name in the past and there is no reason to believe the result will be different on this occasion.

I may make an order prohibiting publication of A’s name and identifying details if necessary to serve the ends of justice.

However, the starting point is a presumption that all aspects of civil court proceedings are subject to disclosure and there must be sound reason to displace that presumption.

I am not persuaded a sound reason exists in this instance. The advice from A, to which I have referred above, was not on oath. I have no other evidence of the threats to which A refers or any evidence of a link between the mere fact of  publication of his name, in connection with any legal proceeding, and the making of any such threat.

Even if such were established, it is for the police to investigate any threat to A and his family, rather than for the Court to prohibit disclosure.

It would seem odd to grant name suppression for claims that something may (or may not) happen in the future.

I therefore decline to make the order for permanent name suppression sought.

A advised me he would wish to appeal any refusal of name suppression. At the end of the hearing, I made an order for interim suppression pending further order of the Court. I continue that order, again subject to further order of the Court, for 20 working days from the date of this judgment to enable A to pursue an appeal if he wishes.

The court has to allow the chance of appeal on suppression so this is standard procedure (appealing isn’t necessarily standard).

INTERIM ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF THE NAME,
ADDRESS OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF THE APPLICANT.

That will be strictly applied here.

The arguments here seem to have been very weak and misconstrued. If it wasn’t for the suppression it could have looked like a lame publicity stunt by someone who has enough knowledge and ignorance of legal procedures to be a time wasting nuisance to the courts.

Full judgment here

Prime Minister is being sued over the lockdown, compared to Hitler

Two people with interim name suppression claiming death threats and safety risks (not sure how that works with a new case with unknown identities) are suing Jacinda Ardern for illegal detention via the COvid-19 lockdown, although one of them is already serving a home detention sentence.

NZ Herald:  ‘All for her political gain’ – Jacinda Ardern sued over lockdown

The Prime Minister is being sued over the lockdown, with two applicants making multiple claims at the High Court in Auckland today – including it being “all for her political gain”.

They also asked for a writ of habeas corpus, which seeks to rule an imprisonment unlawful and release the applicants.

The two men, who are known to each other, argued the alert level 4 lockdown has left them unlawfully detained and is not worth the economic cost compared with the low number of Covid-19 related deaths.

The first applicant, who is currently serving a home detention sentence, told Justice Mary Peters “the whole thing’s a joke” and it has become a “panic-demic, not a pandemic” – noting his sentence allows him to leave the house between 8am and 5pm each day.

He said Ardern had no grounds to enact the lockdown.

He also alleged she had conspired with Sir Stephen Tindall to ruin the economy and the United Nations Secretary-General should have been consulted instead.

The man ultimately compared Ardern to Hitler and the lockdown to the holocaust.

He alleged his views were shared by “a large portion” of the population and said the Crown must have been aware the lockdown would be legally challenged “or thought New Zealand were sheep”.

The man objected to Justice Peters’ question to substitute Ardern for Director-General of Health Dr Ashley Bloomfield, who enacted the lockdown order.

The other applicant alleged more people would now die from other illnesses, like cancer, because they will not be able to get diagnosed due to hospital resources being focused on the fight against Covid-19.

“The Prime Minister made the wrong decision … all for her political gain”, he said.

Justice Peters reserved her decision, but said it would be given urgency.

In my opinion the courts have much more important things to be doing than dealing with this.

As there is interim name suppression (at this stage I think automatic pending arguments rather than based on merit) do not try identify these people.