Research on perceptions on Internet health

Mozilla has done some research on perceptions of the health of the Internet.

New Research: How Germans, Americans, Women and Men Feel About Internet Health

Fresh research from Mozilla explores perceptions of internet health among Americans and Germans; women and men; and various age, income and education levels

Today, Mozilla is publishing research that examines people’s perceptions of internet health.

In our first-ever Attitudes Toward Internet Issues report, we study how people feel about online privacy and security, online harassment, misinformation, openness, and other topics. We also explore how perceptions differ among various demographics, like Americans and Germans, women and men, and various age, income and education levels.

“Our findings reveal that a number of factors — from gender to geography — deeply influence how people perceive the state of the web,” says Sam Burton, who leads the Mozilla Foundation’s research on internet health.

“We also learned that some people are more likely than others to take action to improve the health of the internet,” Burton continues. “Actions might include using open source products, checking the source of a news article before sharing it, or standing up for someone being bullied online.”

Attitudes Toward Internet Issues is built around Mozilla’s five internet health issues: Online Privacy and Security; Openness; Decentralization; Digital Inclusion; and Web Literacy.

Key findings:

Online Privacy and Security is the most well-known internet health issue in both the United States and Germany.

  • Just over 60% of people surveyed in both countries indicate they are aware of the issue
  • Social media data correlates with this finding; posts about Online Privacy and Security surpassed posts about other internet health issues

Men are generally more aware of internet health issues than women in both the United States and Germany.

  • However, the gender gap is much smaller in Germany than in the United States
  • In Germany, women are slightly more aware of Online Privacy and Security than men (69% and 67% respectively). This is the only case in which women were more aware of an internet health issue than men

But women tend to care more about online privacy and security than men in both the United States and Germany.

  • In the United States, 75% of women versus 64% of men care about Online Privacy and Security
  • In Germany, 82% of women versus 68% of men care about Online Privacy and Security

Income and education play an important role in awareness of and engagement with internet health issues

  • The Ipsos survey indicates that people in both the United States and Germany with higher income and higher education are on average two times more likely to report familiarity with the term “internet health” than people with other socioeconomic backgrounds

Awareness of all five internet health issues increased between July 2016 and March 2017 in both the United States and Germany.

  • The up-trend was mild, but notable for all five issues
  • Open Innovation was the slowest to increase, particularly in Germany

Awareness of and concern about internet health issues do not necessarily correlate when accounting for age

  • In Germany, the oldest people surveyed (46+ year olds) are most concerned about Internet health issues
  • In both countries,the youngest people surveyed (16–25 year olds) are the most aware of Internet health issues, but expressed the least concern about most of these issues

Read the full Attitudes Toward Internet Issues report.

Trump statement on Weiner emails

Donald Trump has put out this statement on the FBI bombshell of bugger all.

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Trump is making things up, again.

The FBI stated “cannot yet assess whether or not this material may be significant”. So Trump is making claims he cannot substantiate.

Trump has got away with making false and unsubstantiated claims and accusations through his campaign, to the extent that he still could get elected President of the United States.

If he then continued with his habits of frequent fabricating and lying, and kept attacking the media, and follows through with threats of restricting the media, is that going to be worse than a President Clinton with a record of inappropriate and possibly illegal use of emails?

Clinton appears to have ignored good advice about her use of emails.

Trump has ignored a lot of advice in his campaign.

Two very flawed candidates.

nogoodchoice

Labour supports spy bill

Labour say they will support the Intelligence and Security Bill being introduced to parliament this week through the first reading and intend to push for some improvements at committee stage.

This is a sensible and responsible approach.

It is important that all parties work together to ensure we end up with the best protection possible but keep the best protections possible for privacy of individuals.


Better balance needed in Intelligence Bill

Press Release: New Zealand Labour Party

Andrew Little

Leader of the Opposition

Labour will support the NZ Intelligence and Security Bill to select committee so the issues can be debated nationwide and important amendments can be made, says Opposition Leader Andrew Little.

“The legislation controlling the work and scope of New Zealand’s Intelligence and Security agencies needs to be updated so they can adapt to a rapidly changing environment and new challenges. However this must be balanced with the privacy and rights of all New Zealanders.

“The Cullen Reddy Review showed that amending legislation is necessary. While we will support the Bill at first reading, it does not get the balance quite right. I have confidence changes can be made at select committee which is why Labour will support the Bill at first reading.

“There are concerns in the Bill that Labour wants to see addressed. The definition of National Security must be amended at Select Committee following a national debate. At present the definition is too broad and must be narrowed down to actual threats to security and government.

“It is also concerning that the legislation appears to have ignored a number of the protections for personal information suggested by the Cullen Reddy Review. These are vital and must be a part of the legislation. In today’s world it is too easy to ignore privacy concerns and we have seen what happens in the past when protections aren’t clear.

“Labour is supporting the Bill through its first reading in good faith that these changes can be made. These will result in a better piece of law that gets the balance between security and privacy right,” says Andrew Little.

How exposed is NZ Internet?

A National Exposure Report – Inferring Internet Security Posture by Country Through Port Scanning – says that most exposed nations on the internet today include countries with the largest GDPs, such as the United States, China, France, and Russia.

So that means New Zealand may be relatively unexposed – or is a relatively small and unimportant target. You have to register to read the whole report and I haven’t done that.

The report description and key findings:

This Rapid7 report offers an extensive and technical exploration of data derived from Project Sonar, our security research project that gains insights into global exposure to common vulnerabilities through internet-wide surveys across different services and protocols.  

Given the increased reliance we all have on the internet – for everything from ecommerce, to monitoring the power grid, to adjusting our thermostats – we wanted to leverage the reach of Project Sonar to understand overall internet threat exposure at both a general level and at a country/region level.

  • Millions of systems on the internet offer services that should not be exposed to the public network. Our survey uncovered 15 million nodes appearing to offer telnet, 11.2 million appearing to offer direct access to relational databases, and 4.5 million apparent printer services.
  • 4.7 million systems expose one of the most commonly attacked ports used by Microsoft systems, 445/TCP.
  • SSH (secure shell) adoption over telnet (cleartext shell) is gaining ground over telnet, with over 50% of regions offering more ssh servers than telnet servers.
  • Non-web-based access to email (via cleartext POP or IMAP protocols) is still the norm versus the exception in virtually every country.
  • There is a correlation between the GDP of a nation, overall internet “presence” in terms of services offered, and the exposure of insecure, cleartext services.
  • The most exposed nations on the internet today include countries with the largest GDPs, such as the United States, China, France, and Russia.

It is not surprising that the largest countries are the most exposed.

I’ll just keep an up to date OS and up to date security software (I use Norton) and be careful which emails I open (I’ve had a lot of job offers lately, including from myself) and hope that my ISP and the GCSB do the rest.

Why Bomber’s claims are totally meaningless

In his latest rant against our intelligence agencies Martyn Bradbury has bombed with a mass of misfires.

The headline: Why the ‘protections’ in new spy bill are totally meaningless

There is no new spy bill. And Independent Review has just released a report that makes observations and recommendations.

Let’s get this straight – our intelligence agencies have been caught illegally spying on NZers, were caught helping the PMs Office smear the leader of the Opposition months before the 2011 election with falsified lies, were caught being racist, were caught spying on our trade partners to try and get John Key’s mate a job, were caught out by Edward Snowden telling the NSA that legislation had loopholes to allow mass surveillance, were caught out by Edward Snowden planning to tap the Southern Cross internet cable and were caught possibly aiding the CIA rendition torture program.

Most of those claims are questionable. Some of those issues are still under inquiry so it isn’t know whether anyone has been caught doing what Bradbury asserts.

So how does Key respond to intelligence agencies drunk on their own power?

Bradbury is drunk on hyperbole. The intelligence agencies are being reported on, not requesting changes.

Why he is suggesting even more power.

No he isn’t. He is suggesting a multi-party approach to assessing the recommendations of the independent review and deciding what might be done.

Why the hell would we give the GCSB and SIS more power when they can’t manage the power they currently have?

The report says “It was clear to us from our discussions with GCSB staff and from the GCSB’s own internal policy documents that these restrictions are interpreted and applied conservatively.” Is Bradbury wanting them to apply policies more aggressively?

The reality is that the so called 3 tier system of protections being suggested by the new legislation are utterly meaningless. The loophole built into the suggested legislation allows the spies to disregard all 3 of those tiers IF they believe there is an emergency or risk to life,  they then get 48 hours of warrantless surveillance.

This allows fishing expeditions for the spies.

Again, there is no new legislation. It should not allow fishing expeditions.

We must demand more protections for ourselves from this ever growing ultra secret deep state. A modern day stasi that answers to the NSA doesn’t make our democracy safer, it makes it far more dangerous.

Demanding more protections for ourselves is fine, but protecting ourselves from others requires some secret surveillance powers.

Likening New Zealand to a “modern day stasi ” is just pathetic.

Bradbury has bombed this with his hyperbole – “an extreme exaggeration used to make a point”. The problem is this sort of hyperbole doesn’t make any point other than the lack of credibility of the ranter.

No mass surveillance

The First Independent Review of Intelligence and Security in New Zealand  looked at whether mass surveillance was being carried out by the GCSB.

The report  concludes that there is no mass surveillance.

It was clear to us from our discussions with GCSB staff and from the GCSB’s own internal policy documents that these restrictions are interpreted and applied conservatively.

Far from carrying out “mass surveillance” of New Zealanders, the GCSB is unable to intercept New Zealanders’ communications even where it is for their own safety.

For example, the GCSB would be unable to analyse the communications of a New Zealander taken hostage in a foreign country unless it was assisting the NZSIS, NZDF or Police under their legislation.

That’s unlikely to change the minds of security and surveillance critics. Green co-leader Metiria Turei:

The GCSB had already been “quite liberal and loose” with their existing activities, and they should not be given more powers until it was clear they would follow the law.

That’s the opposite of what the report found.

Here are relevant references from the report.

1.11   In New Zealand, there has been considerable debate in the media about whether the GCSB conducts “mass surveillance” of New Zealanders. Having spent some months learning about the Agencies’ operations in detail, we have concluded that this is not the case, for reasons we discuss below.  However, there is a degree of scepticism among the New Zealand public about the Agencies’ activities.

In a survey carried out by the Privacy Commissioner in 2014, 52 percent of respondents were concerned about surveillance by New Zealand government agencies. We received a number of submissions from people who did not see the need for intelligence and security agencies at all and considered there was no justification for the government intruding on individuals’ privacy.

Does the GCSB conduct “mass surveillance”?

3.34  As we discussed in Chapter 1, there has been some debate in the public arena about whether the GCSB conducts “mass surveillance”. In light of this, we considered it important to describe what the GCSB does and does not do. While we cannot go into as much detail as we would have liked given the classified nature of the GCSB’s operational activities, we hope what we can say will inform this debate in a useful way.

3.35  “Mass surveillance” is a term that can be understood in a number of different ways. In this context it is important to distinguish between communications that are collected by GCSB systems – for example, its satellite interception station at Waihopai – and those that are actually selected and examined by an analyst.

3.36  The reality of modern communications is that it is often not possible to identify and copy a specific communication of interest in isolation. If a particular satellite might carry a relevant communication, the GCSB cannot search for that communication before interception occurs. First it needs to intercept a set of communications, most of which will be of no relevance and will be discarded without ever being examined by an analyst. This is the haystack in which the needle must be found.

3.37  Even this “haystack” represents only a tiny proportion of global communications. The GCSB conservatively estimates that there are over 1 billion communications events every day on the commercial satellites that are visible from Waihopai station. These represent approximately 25 percent of commercial satellites that match the Earth’s rotation (although signals cannot always be secured even from those satellites that are visible). We were told the proportion of those 1 billion communications that are actually intercepted equates to roughly one half of a bucket of water out of an Olympic-sized swimming pool.

3.38  To find the “needle” (or the communications that are of intelligence value), the GCSB filters intercepted material for relevance using search terms. Only those communications that meet the selection criteria are ever seen by an analyst. The GCSB has internal processes in place toensure analysts justify their use of each search term and record all searches for the purpose of internal audits and review by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.

3.39 Given these controls on what information can actually be examined by analysts, in our view the GCSB’s ability to intercept sets of communications does not amount to mass surveillance. That term suggests a kind of active monitoring of the general population that does not occur. It would neither be lawful nor even possible given the GCSB’s resourcing constraints.

3.40 Capacity acts as a check on all signals intelligence agencies, although it is particularly pronounced for the GCSB given its comparatively small size. It is simply not possible to monitor communications (or other data) indiscriminately. Professor Michael Clarke, the (now retired) Director-General of the UK’s Royal United Services Institute who convened the 2015 Independent Surveillance Review, referred to this when giving evidence before the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill:97 The other great safeguard is the sheer physical capacity. One will be astonished at how little [intelligence agencies] can do, because it takes so much human energy to go down one track. The idea that the state somehow has a huge control centre where it is watching what we do is a complete fantasy. The state and GCHQ [the UK’s signal’s intelligence agency] have astonishingly good abilities, but it is as if they can shine a rather narrow beam into many areas of cyberspace and absorb what is revealed in that little, narrow beam. If they shine it there, they cannot shine it elsewhere. The human limitation on how many cases they can look at once is probably the biggest safeguard.

3.41 We also observe that there are currently restrictions on the GCSB’s ability to intercept the private communications of New Zealand citizens and permanent residents. These restrictions apply to New Zealanders anywhere in the world, not just those in New Zealand. It was clear to us from our discussions with GCSB staff and from the GCSB’s own internal policy documents that these restrictions are interpreted and applied conservatively. Far from carrying out “mass surveillance” of New Zealanders, the GCSB is unable to intercept New Zealanders’ communications even where it is for their own safety. For example, the GCSB would be unable to analyse the communications of a New Zealander taken hostage in a foreign country unless it was assisting the NZSIS, NZDF or Police under their legislation.

 

 

 

Security versus privacy

The review of our spy agencies the GCSB and the SIS has reignited the security versus privacy issue.

Ideally we need to find a way of improving security, which requires some surveillance, while strengthening the protection of personal privacy. We should be targeting simpler clearer laws, possibly with some greater powers but with greater transparency and much better independent and political oversight.

A number of related reports:

Jane Patterson at Radio NZ: Security v privacy: A balancing act

A review of New Zealand’s intelligence agencies has found the laws governing the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Security Communications Bureau (GCSB) are clunky, inconsistent and preventing those agencies from properly carrying out their jobs.

The challenge confronting lawmakers, past and present, is how to balance citizens’ rights to living in a safe and secure country, against their rights to privacy.

She concludes:

The review has attempted to balance the rights of security against privacy by proposing stronger oversight and warranting provisions.

It is now up to the politicians to strike that balance in line with the expectations of the New Zealand public.

A look at our chief security overseer at Stuff: National Portrait: Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Cheryl Gwyn

Gwyn is the official spy watchdog, and she bites.

Gwyn has begun a series of inquiries which ask dangerous questions about both the SIS and the other intelligence agency, the GCSB.

Did the GCSB use its powers to help former Trade Minister Tim Groser in his (unsuccessful) bid to become head of the World Trade Organisation?

Were New Zealand spies involved with the CIA’s torture of prisoners between September 2001 and January 2009?

Does the GCSB snoop on the communications of New Zealanders working or holidaying in the South Pacific?

This could be a breach of the law preventing the GCSB from bugging New Zealand citizens or permanent residents. It was the bureau’s illegal bugging of permanent resident Kim Dotcom that lit a firestorm under the GCSB.

Claire Trevett on Michael Cullen and the review: The ex-politician who came in from the cold

Cullen proved the perfect man to front the report for the Government. His own lengthy tenure as Deputy Prime Minister and Attorney-General meant he was well aware of the type of information the intelligence agencies provide, and the importance of that information for a government.

He told the spy agencies to up their game when it came to public relations if they wanted to reduce public scepticism about their role. He then proceeded to do that PR for them, running through a list of threats to New Zealand from domestic attacks to cybercrimes. He spoke of whether the GCSB could help if a New Zealander was lost at sea or taken hostage – hypothetical situations but based on actual risks New Zealand had faced.

That it also makes it harder for Labour to quibble with the recommendations put forward is almost the only the cherry on the top.

If we are to achieve better security and better privacy it’s essential for both National and Labour to work together on this without partisan sniping. They will both at times be in the most responsible position for providing security for the country and protection of us, the citizens.

Cullen on virtual merger of GCSB and SIS

The security review was forbidden from suggesting a merger of our two spy agencies, SIS and GCSB, but it has gone as far as it can in recommending much closer links between the two.

Claire Trevett: A proposed ‘civil union’ of two intelligence agencies

Sir Michael Cullen has never been one to mince words so when he was asked why he and Dame Patsy Reddy had not simply recommended a merger of the two intelligence agencies, he was blunt: it was because the Government had not allowed it under the terms of reference.

That didn’t stop him recommending what amounts to a merger in all but name, which will see the GCSB and SIS remain technically separate entities but controlled by the same legislation with very similar powers – it was, as Dr Cullen said “a civil union”.

The most controversial aspect of it is likely to be the recommendation to allow the GCSB to spy on New Zealanders without requiring a warrant to do so on the behalf of other parties. It breaks a longstanding split between the SIS and GCSB under which the GCSB could only spy on foreigners and the SIS on New Zealanders.

The examples Dr Cullen gave of the virtue of extending that to the GCSB were rather sympathetic to his own case – he spoke of a New Zealander lost at sea and said the GCSB would not be able to use its cellphone tracking technology to find that person because they were a New Zealander.

In reality the split of powers had become increasingly redundant anyway. The review team also proposed a strong authorisation process to ensure there was not indiscriminate spying. In reality that split of powers had become increasingly redundant.

Sir Michael pointed out the SIS had the power to spy domestically but the GCSB had the technology to do so. In terms of the difference in the technology between the two, he said “it’s really a question of can you use Snicko and Hawkeye or can’t you in order to establish whether there was a no ball?”

Dr Cullen argued it was not a vast expansion of powers, but rather an attempt to clear up the current conflict for the GCSB. The legislation covering the GCSB already allows it to spy on behalf of other agencies with a warrant. One of Dr Cullen’s more surprising admissions was that despite the attempt to change the GCSB’s legislation to specify when it could spy on New Zealanders, the GCSB had only become more hesitant to do so. That happened after it was found to have unlawfully spied on more than 100 people due to confusion over its powers when acting on behalf of other agencies.

Dr Cullen said the GCSB and it had become overly cautious in the wake of that controversy to an extent it was impacting on its work. That had, he argued, almost put the Government in a position of failing in its duty to protect the lives of New Zealanders.

In short the review recommends a simplification of multiple laws, clarification of what powers the SIS and especially the GCSB have, and better oversight.

If the recommendations are followed – and they will need the approval of both National and Labour at least – it could leave two separate agencies but in practice sets up a virtual merger.

Balancing the need for effective security with the privacy of individuals will continue to be contentious.

Intelligence and security review

The report of the First Independent Review of Intelligence and Security in New Zealand was released today.

Stuff reports: Spy agencies explainer: What you need to know about the report into spying laws

What’s this spying report about?

Sir Michael Cullen and Dame Patsy Reddy have published their independent report on the laws that cover New Zealand’s spy agencies – more specifically, whether they’re fit for purpose or need changes.

What have they said?

There are 107 recommendations, but the main one is a new law to cover both the SIS and the GCSB. The agencies are currently covered by various pieces of legislation dating as far back as the 1960s, and Cullen says having one law for both agencies will eliminate the confusion and contradictions that are stopping them from working together more effectively.

Reactions:

What do our politicians think about the report?

Key has been fairly complimentary, saying it makes “some very valid points” about improving the balance between national security and the public’s right to privacy.

Labour leader Andrew Little says he “certainly sees some sense” in having one law for both agencies, but he has some concerns about how far the GCSB’s powers will be expanded, as well as proposals to provide the agencies with greater access to government agencies’ databases.

Green Party co-leader Metiria Turei is scathing about the report, saying the recommended changes would represent “one of the most significant erosions in New Zealanders’ privacy that we’ve seen in modern times”.

And…

So, what happens next?

Key says the Government will take a look at the recommendations and speak to Labour about what the two parties could back together.

Any new legislation would be put forward by July, although the Government wouldn’t necessarily adopt every proposal, and the law would go before a select committee so the public could share their thoughts.

Key is keen to win cross-party support, and Little’s initial comments seem to indicate Labour could back some form of new law, which would provide a comfortable majority.

GCSB and SIS review – public views sought

Public submissions are now being sought as part of the independent review of New Zealand’s intelligence and security legislation.

Michael Cullen and Patsy Reddy, who are carrying out the review, have put out a press release advising of the submission  process, asking the public for their views on “what the GCSB and NZSIS should be doing to protect New Zealand”.

I presume that allows for public views on what the GCSB and SIS shouldn’t be doing.

Intelligence and security reviewers seek public’s views

The independent reviewers examining New Zealands intelligence and security legislation are calling for public submissions.Intelligence and security reviewers seek public’s views

“We are seeking public submissions to help us determine what issues to focus on during the review,” says Sir Michael. “We want to hear your views on what the GCSB and NZSIS should be doing to protect New Zealand and how they should do it.”

“We also want to hear what would give you confidence that the agencies are acting in the best interests of New Zealand and New Zealanders while having due regard to their rights and freedoms,” says Dame Patsy.

The review will consider the legislation relating to the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) and New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS), and the oversight of the agencies. It will also assess whether the new legislative provisions introduced late last year by the Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill should be extended beyond their current expiry date of 1 April 2017.

Submissions will be open until 5pm on Friday 14 August 2015. You can make a submission online by visiting https://consultations.justice.govt.nz/independent/iris, or you can make a submission by email or post using the call for submissions document available on the website. The website also includes some resources to assist you in making a submission.

More details were given via a Q & A.

Questions about the review

Why is this review being carried out?

Legislation passed in 2013 made several changes to clarify the law governing the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) and improve oversight of New Zealand’s intelligence and security agencies – the GCSB and New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS).

One of these changes was to introduce regular independent reviews of the intelligence and security agencies and their governing legislation.

Regular reviews will help to ensure the law keeps up with changing risks to national security, while protecting individual rights and maintaining public confidence in the agencies.

Who is conducting the review?

Hon Sir Michael Cullen and Dame Patsy Reddy are the independent reviewers, appointed by the Acting Attorney-General Hon Amy Adams in consultation with the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.

Biographies of the independent reviewers are available at https://consultations.justice.govt.nz/independent/iris.

What will the review cover?

The review will determine:

1. Whether the legislative frameworks of the intelligence and security agencies (GCSB and NZSIS) are well placed to protect New Zealand’s current and future national security, while protecting individual rights;

2. Whether the current oversight arrangements provide sufficient safeguards at an operational, judicial and political level to ensure the GCSB and NZSIS act lawfully and maintain public confidence.

The full terms of reference for the 2015 review can be viewed at: http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/i/intelligence-and-security-agencies-review.

How long will the review take?

The review will be completed by the end of February 2016.

When can I read the independent reviewers’ report?

The independent reviewers must provide the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament with a report containing the results of their review by the end of February 2016.

After the Committee has considered the report, the Committee must present the report to the House of Representatives subject to any restrictions on the disclosure of information under section 18(3) of the Intelligence and Security Committee Act 1996.

Where can I find more information about the review?

The Intelligence and Security Committee Act 1996 establishes the statutory framework for the review. You can read the Act at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/.

The announcement from Hon Amy Adams appointing the independent reviewers, including biographies of the independent reviewers and the full terms of reference for the 2015 review, can be viewed at: https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/intelligence-and-security-review-commence-june.

The notice in the New Zealand Gazette can be read at: https://gazette.govt.nz/notice/id/2015-go3140.

Any future announcements about the review will be posted on http://www.justice.govt.nz/.

What other reviews of the intelligence agencies have there been?

There have been a number of reviews in recent years relating to specific aspects of the intelligence and security agencies, for example the Murdoch review in 2009 and the Kitteridge review in 2012. The agencies in the core New Zealand Intelligence Community were also subject to a Performance Improvement Framework Review in late 2013. However, this will be the first review to look at the broader legislative framework and oversight of the agencies.

How does the review relate to the Law Commission’s work on classified information in court proceedings?

The Law Commission’s work has a specific focus on the rules and processes governing use and protection of security sensitive information in court proceedings. However, it is anticipated that the Law Commission’s work will complement the wider review.

While both pieces of work will proceed independently, there will be opportunities for the Commission and independent reviewers to share research and thinking if common issues arise.

Questions about the submissions process

When can I make a submission?

Submissions are open until 5.00pm on Friday 14 August 2015.

How can I make a submission?

You can make a submission online or download the consultation document to make a written submission at https://consultations.justice.govt.nz/independent/iris. Written submissions can be emailed to IRISsupport@justice.govt.nz or posted to IRIS Support Team, Ministry of Justice, Level 3 – Justice Centre, 19 Aitken Street, Wellington, DX SX10088.

I don’t know the answer to some of the consultation questions. Do I have to answer them all?

No, you do not need to answer all of the questions. None of them are mandatory.

Why is my submission being sent to the Ministry of Justice?

As stated in section 26 of the Intelligence and Security Committee Act 1996, the Ministry of Justice is responsible for providing administrative, secretarial, and other support to the independent reviewers. This includes assisting with public consultation.

What happens with my submission?

Your submission will help the independent reviewers to decide what issues the review should focus on within the broad terms of reference. Your submission is sought for the purposes of this independent review only. It will not be shared with government agencies other than the Ministry of Justice (which is providing administrative support for the review) or released publicly.

After the independent reviewers have considered your submission, the independent reviewers or a member of the Ministry of Justice support team may wish to contact you to discuss your submission. At the beginning of the submission form you will be asked to indicate whether you are willing to be contacted for this purpose.