Nottingham conviction and sentence appeal – judgment

The Court of Appeal judgment of Dermot Nottingham’s unsuccessful appeals against conviction and sentence (and the successful Crown appeal calling for a harsher sentence) is now online – NOTTINGHAM v R [2019] NZCA 344 [30 July 2019].

The judgment found that there was strong evidence linking Nottingham with harassing and defamatory posts on the Lauda Finem website – I will cover this in more detail in another post.

Nottingham’s argument in his defence were in part self-defeating. He claimed:

  • Posts on an overseas based blog (Lauda Finem) were not covered by New Zealand law.
  • There was no evidence that he was responsible for the posts.
  • The posts were truthful so could not be deemed to be harassment or breaches of suppression.
  • The five people he was found guilty of harassing “started it” and deserved to be attacked.

The trial jury, the trial judge and the three Court of Appeal judges disagreed with him on all these claims.

His sentence was increased to 31 months in prison, but as he had already served three and a half months home detention this still qualified him for a home detention sentence. While the offences were judged to be serious he was largely spared time in prison due to serious health problems. He was re-sentenced to a further 12 months home detention (including a ban on using the internet), 100 hours commununity service, plus a further six month ban on using the internet after home detention finishes.

He was originally charged in 2015 and went to trial last year after a number of delays.

Following a five-week jury trial before Judge Down, Mr Nottingham was convicted in May 2018 of five charges of criminal harassment and two charges of publishing information in breach of a suppression order. He was subsequently
sentenced by the Judge to 12 months’ home detention and 100 hours of community work. He appeals both his conviction and sentence. The Solicitor-General also appeals the sentence, on the grounds of manifest inadequacy and error in principle.

The suppression charges:

In his summing-up, Judge Down directed that publication of the brothers’ names had occurred in New Zealand in breach of the suppression order. The key issues for the jury were, therefore, whether Mr Nottingham was the publisher or a party to the publication, and whether he had done so knowingly or recklessly in breach of the suppression order

The criminal harassment charges:

In the course of investigating the breaches of name suppression, the police identified a number of LF articles which they considered amounted to criminal harassment. Charges were laid in respect of five complainants, all of whom have been granted permanent name suppression and who we will refer to as T, C, H, B and M. The common denominator between them all was that they had at some stage crossed Mr Nottingham’s path in circumstances he took issue with.

In respect of each complainant, articles appeared on the LF website containing material the Crown alleged was “offensive” in terms of the Harassment Act 1997.

The articles included names, photographs and other personal details indicating extensive background research on each of the targets. It was alleged that some of the photographs had been obtained by Mr Nottingham or by one of his associates at Mr Nottingham’s direction. It was common for Mr Nottingham to ensure that articles were drawn to his complainants’ attention by providing them with the electronic links. The Crown also alleged various other acts of harassment — including “following” and in one case initiating a private prosecution.

At the same time he was being prosecuted for those offences Nottingham and associates continued act in a similar manner, as the many ongoing attack posts on LF show. He also unsuccessfully attempted four other private prosecutions, including one against myself. Two of these went to trial and were dismissed and described as vexatious.

As he attempted several times in my case he applied to adduce new evidence, usually a last minute stunt (the morning of hearings and in two cases during a hearing).

Mr Nottingham filed four affidavits, including one of 333 paragraphs by his brother, P R Nottingham. We assume the premise to be that they represent fresh or relevant new evidence.

We do not regard any of this material as meeting the test for admission in Lundy v R. It is neither fresh, nor (in most cases) relevant.

That sounds very familiar.

The breach of suppression order charges:

Mr Nottingham pursues two arguments:

(a) LF is overseas domiciled and “you cannot be a party to a crime that never occurred in an overseas jurisdiction”.

In his summing-up, the Judge directed that, as a matter of law, publication occurs where material is comprehended and downloaded and that accordingly there was publication in New Zealand irrespective of LF’s domicile. He said that this was a function of “Judge-made” law and that it was also a feature of s 7 of the Crimes Act 1961.

We identify no error in that direction. It did not involve any assumption of extra-territorial jurisdiction. It stated what we regard as a now uncontentious proposition: that a blog available to New Zealand internet users is regarded as published in New Zealand.

They make it clear that using an overseas based website (like WordPress) does not exempt you from New Zealand law if  it is directed at a New Zealand audience.

Physical location of the LF server was, in that context, irrelevant. What was required was proof either of direct publication (that Mr Nottingham was LF), indirect publication (that Mr Nottingham was a co-principal with LF, working directly with it to effect publication in New Zealand) or that he was a party to LF’s publication. That is exactly as the trial Judge put it to the jury, supported by an accurate description of the “party” requirements. Mr Krebs is correct that the question of whether Mr Nottingham “caused” the publication (in any of the legal senses relevant) was a matter of fact for the jury. No error of law was made by the trial Judge.

(b) The Crown failed to establish to the criminal standard that he was either the publisher of the material or a party to its publication.

The Crown advanced a circumstantial case. As Mr Nottingham reminded us, there was no “smoking gun” in the sense of an email attaching a final draft of the articles sent to LF. Nor was there any “electronic footprint” on any of the computers searched by the police which demonstrated that the article, as published, had originated from Mr Nottingham.

…Turning then to the circumstantial evidence relied on by the Crown to establish publication, we agree with Ms Brook that it was very strong, if not overwhelming.

I will cover this more detail in the next post,

We are not therefore satisfied that the verdicts on the breach of suppression charges were unreasonable or that the convictions resulted from a miscarriage of justice.

In Nottingham’s hapless attempt at prosecuting me (and three others) he claimed that we had in some convoluted way enabled people to find their way to suppression breach posts on LF – posts that he has been found guilty of posting.

Conviction appeal — the criminal harassment charges

Again, both the Crown and Mr Krebs submit that the appropriate approach is to treat Mr Nottingham’s appeal as essentially a challenge to the reasonableness of the jury verdicts. We agree, although noting that the main focus of Mr Nottingham’s second set of written submissions (filed on the morning of the appeal hearing), and of his oral submissions, was on the proposition that he ought not to have been convicted because the statements made in the articles (whether by him or not) were true or, alternatively, opinions based in truth.

…Identity (in the sense of responsibility for the acts either as principal or party) was therefore in issue on all charges. Again, Mr Nottingham’s position (both at trial and on appeal) was that there was no evidence of information being communicated from computers under his control to the LF website. And again, the Crown case was (and is) the evidence identifying him as the “driving force” behind the harassment was, if not overwhelming, certainly very strong. We start with that issue, because of its relevance also to the breach of suppression convictions.

We do not consider it necessary to set out all of the circumstantial evidence relied on by the Crown to establish identity in respect of each of the harassment charges. We agree that the jury’s conclusion on the facts was one reasonably available to it. Indeed, we consider it almost inevitable.

In the case of T, Mr Nottingham sent her a link to the first article immediately after it was published and a draft, created two days before publication, was found on a computer to which he had access. In addition, images appearing in the other articles were found on the same computer.

In the case of C, word versions of all three articles were found on a computer to which Mr Nottingham had access together with images from the articles. Likewise, drafts of other unpublished articles were also found.

In the case of B, although no draft of the principal article (published on 24 April 2013) was identified, the draft of another “unpublished” article (prepared approximately a year later) was found, and this contained very similar references to the 2013 publication. For example, the published article interposed the description “belted” between the complainant’s first and last names, and the draft contained the phrase “Beat Me”. The published article described her as “a stupid troll”, the draft as a “dumb cow” and “complete fuckwit”.

In the case of H, a word version of the first article was found on one of the computers, together with photographic images which were included in the articles and a screen shot of H’s Facebook profile. Likewise, screenshots of images in the third article were identified, as was the draft of another unpublished article in a similar vein.

And in respect of M, a word version of the first article was found on a computer to which Mr Nottingham had access together with the image of H which appeared in the same article.

In addition to this specific evidence, there was also a body of general evidence establishing either that Mr Nottingham was LF, a co-principal of LF or was, at a minimum, a party to the publications.

Although much was made of the fact that others had access to the computers at Mr Nottingham’s Hillsborough residence, particularly his brothers Anthony and Phillip, there was ample evidence that Mr Nottingham had overall responsibility and control. For example, there was an email in which Anthony told Mr Nottingham to stop treating him “like one of your fucking employees”.

Funny. While the Nottinghams, and other associatess like Earle McKinney, Marc Spring and Cameron Slater, where all involved in various ways in various campaigns of attack and harassment, they didn’t always get along with each other. very well.

By a wide margin we conclude that on the issue of “identity”, Mr Nottingham fails to satisfy us that the jury’s verdict was unreasonable.

Nottingham has tried to claim or imply it wasn’t him, but if it was it didn’t matter anyway.

Mr Nottingham cast the prosecution as an attack on his unalienable rights of free speech and as having a “chilling effect” on his “legitimate exercise of natural and legal rights”. He said that truth is a complete answer to any allegation that material given to any person or placed on electronic media was offensive within the terms of the Harassment Act.

Except that as is made clear later while posts at LF may have been based on skerricks of truth they were substantially embellished and bolstered by false claims.

The trial judge is quoted:

It has been pointed out already that given the highly inflammatory and abusive language used to impart the truth in some of these Lauda Finem articles, the Crown says that claim of truth is something of a red herring. It is also fair to say that even truthful allegations can be made and repeated in ways that are intended to and do in fact harass.

You might remember [C] in cross-examination saying effectively that these things are not true (was her response) but, even if they were, it does not mean that they can be repeated and presented in this way, in a way that makes me feel harassed and frightened.

The Court of Appeal:

We do not consider the trial Judge to have erred in his approach to this issue. The jury was legitimately entitled to take into account truth or falsity in its assessment of offensiveness, but it was only one part of a composite of considerations relevant in that respect.

Much of what was published could at best be described as virulent opinion with only a tangential connection to anything arguably true. And in respect of many of the comments, we regard even that description as excessively generous.

As the Crown said in closing, the posts were littered with “hate-filled [invective]” and were strongly misogynistic.
T was, for example, described as a “useless fucktard” and “scum of scum of scum and then some scum”. It was said that she wanted an identified person dead and was operating “in a similar fashion to the manner in which the [Nazis] singled out the Jewish community”. In respect of C, her surname was predicated by the sobriquet “cumsac”. And it was said she needed to be “brought to justice before she commits very serious offending such as murder”.

M was described as a “bent ex-cop” with the suggestion he was “on the take” (allegations vehemently denied and never established).

I have seen Nottingham claim many things (in court documents) as truth and evidence that has not been backed up with any actual evidence.

Anyone who has read through posts on LF will recognise this style of attack that bears very little semblance to “truth”.

It was not unreasonable for the jury to identify such material as offensive.

Now the bit where Nottingham claims he was justified in doing what he also tried to claim he didn’t do.

We also note that the “lawful purpose” which Mr Nottingham asserted at trial was his ability to respond to actions by the complainants which he considered to be unlawful or unjust.

(H was alleged to have been complicit in her husband’s operation of a website Mr Nottingham considered to be fraudulent; M was alleged to havemisconducted himself in office in a way which resulted in financial loss to
Mr Nottingham; C had made a police complaint about an associate of Mr Nottingham’s he alleged to be false; T had made accusations he considered baseless and B had assisted H’s husband).

A similar point appears in his written submissions on appeal, where he refers to “the issue as to whether the complainants had contributed to their problems”, albeit in a paragraph which combines submissions in relation to both conviction and sentencing. In oral submissions he further urged on us the fact that “they started it”.

We note the inconsistency of that argument with his underlying proposition that there was inadequate proof he was either the publisher of the LF articles or a party thereto.

However, that aside, the proposition that “they deserved it” was self-evidently not a defence to the charges Mr Nottingham faced.

We are also satisfied that the jury’s verdict was not unreasonable in its implicit acceptance that the intention/knowledge requirements in s 8 of the Harassment Act were proven.

The Crown case was that anyone who discovered they were a target of LF would reasonably fear for, among other things, their mental wellbeing and that this was plainly intended by Mr Nottingham, or at least he knew that it was a likely result.

As previously stated, attacks along similar lines continued on LF at the same time that Nottingham was being prosecuted – and he was protected from public exposure with name suppression.

T’s concerns included to her physical wellbeing. This was because of photographs posted to the site from someone who had clearly been tracking her movements and because the phrase “two head shots to be sure”, had been inserted  between her first and last names in the 29 April 2013 article. Her fears were compounded by the fact that the article was forwarded to her with a link to a scene from the Quentin Tarantino film “Pulp Fiction” which showed a person being shot in the head.

Although Mr Nottingham suggested that this was a reference to T’s treatment of certain people, we agree with the Judge that “it is not unreasonable and should have been foreseeable that those statements would be read as a threat towards [T]”.

I had implied death threats directed at myself on LF and Twitter, but I suspect it more likely to be via associates.

Nottingham submitted that the trial judge:

… did not fairly sum up the competing evidence, effectively casting aside the evidence that established that [the complainants] were not telling the truth, when the prosecution was alleging defamation.

But:

In this case, we regard as compelling the following exchange between the Judge and Mr Nottingham which occurred in chambers immediately after the summing-up:

The Court: All right, now any matters arising?

Mr Nottingham: Sir, may I comment that that was a very fair summing up.

The Court: Thank you. I tried very hard to ensure that it was.

Mr Nottingham: It was.

A number of other complaints were dissected and overruled.

Accordingly, Mr Nottingham’s appeal against conviction is dismissed.

The sentence appeals

The sentence was premised on the following findings of fact which we agree were consistent with the jury’s verdicts:

(a) Mr Nottingham either was LF (in other words the leading mind of that blog) or he was so intimately related to it that it was proper to conclude that he provided information and draft articles to that blog knowing and intending that they would be published.

(b) Publication and other intimidating and harassing conduct was either carried out by Mr Nottingham himself or at his direction and he knew his conduct was likely to cause the individuals involved to fear for their safety or that of family members.

(c) Although Mr Nottingham may, at least initially, have reasonably believed he had legitimate grievances in respect of the complainants, he elected to pursue these, not by lawful and reasonable means, but by personal attacks on an “anything goes” basis.

The trial judge on the harassment charges…

…it went “without saying” that all of the offences were sufficiently serious to justify a starting point of imprisonment.

CoA:

In respect of the breach of non-publication orders, the Judge noted the Crown submission that the maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment be adopted as the start point. The Judge categorised these breaches as blatant and contemptuous and noted Mr Nottingham showed no remorse.

In respect of the combined total starting point of two years and four months’ imprisonment, he then gave a four-month discount to reflect what he described as Mr Nottingham’s “multi-faceted and complex” health problems, which in the Judge’s view meant that a sentence of imprisonment would be much harder for him than for an average middle-aged man in reasonable health. He identified this as the only mitigating factor resulting in a provisional end sentence of two years’ imprisonment. That required that the Judge give consideration to home detention which, consistent with authority, he recognised as having a general and specific deterrence value.

He said he regarded home detention as an appropriate and sufficient response.

The indicated months’ home detention sentence was then apportioned in the way we have previously indicated. Special conditions were imposed including that Mr Nottingham attend counselling or treatment programmes as directed by a probation officer and that he not use any electronic device capable of accessing the internet without prior approval from
a probation officer.

Again Nottingham seems to be speaking on behalf of whoever posted at LF:

Mr Nottingham said that the sentences should be commuted to time served (three and a half months home detention) and without the requirement for community work on the primary ground that the LF articles on which the harassment charges were based were “not designed to make anyone fear for their safety”.

How would he know what the design of the posts was if he wasn’t involved?

By contrast, the Crown submitted the sentence was manifestly inadequate and that nothing less than a custodial sentence is sufficient to capture the level of denunciation and deterrence required for what it says was an egregious breach of non-publication orders and malicious and misogynistic attacks on members of the public.

Ms Brook submitted that manifest inadequacy arises primarily from the wayin which the sentences were structured, and in particular, what she says was an excessive discount for totality. She submitted that the final sentence should have been in the region of three years five months’ imprisonment, made up of cumulative sentences, save that the sentences for the two breaches of the suppression order were properly imposed concurrently with each other and cumulatively on the sentences for criminal harassment.

…Ms Brook therefore submitted that the Judge’s sentence should be quashed and a new sentence imposed in the region of two years and 10 months’ imprisonment.

We accept Ms Brook’s submission that the offending against C and T justified a 12-month starting point for each.
The language used was particularly demeaning and offensive and the fact that a photograph was taken of T without her knowledge and subsequently published must have been calculated to add to her insecurity.

The offending against B, H and M was not as serious, although there were strongly misogynistic elements in the articles about B and H and the implication that M was corrupt was clearly a very damaging one given the nature of his employment.

We consider cumulative sentences of six months (in relation to the offending against B), five months (in relation to the offending against H) and five months (in relation to the offending against M) appropriate.

In respect of the breach of suppression offences, we agree with the Judge that they were sufficiently interconnected and similar in kind to attract concurrent.

Discount for poor health

In respect of the Judge’s four-month discount for ill health, we consider that he was particularly well placed to make the necessary assessment.

We agree with the Judge that Mr Nottingham presented with a complex combination of physical and mental health problems. Several reports identify him as suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) attributable to childhood
trauma and although Dr Skipworth says this diagnosis “is controversial in cases of life-long trauma such as Mr Nottingham describes”, nevertheless he accepts it is one way clinicians choose to diagnose and understand “long-term personality dysfunction, interpersonal relational difficulties, cognitive impairment and mood dysregulation in presentations such as Mr Nottingham’s”.

We also note a diagnosis of a traumatic brain injury sustained in a high-speed motorcycle accident in 1996 and a further serious motorcycle accident in 2016 which Dr Walls was concerned had “significantly aggravated the old traumatic brain injury”.

Likewise, Mr Nottingham suffers from a significant number of physical impairments, principal among them recurrent and serious atrial fibrillation. This condition in turn compounds the congestive heart failure from which he also suffers. Multiple hospital admissions have resulted.

Overall, we are not persuaded that the Judge was wrong to make the allowance he did.

There’s not doubt there are serious health issues (and more than what is stated here), and that prison would impose more hardship than normal.

With such a dire health report I wonder that there would be far better and more important things to do than harass people and get bogged down in lengthy court procedures.

Combining the totality and health discounts, we therefore arrive at a sentence of 31 months’ imprisonment which is approximately 30 per cent higher than the Judge’s end point.

In re-sentencing Mr Nottingham we are, however, obliged to take into account the three and a half months of home detention he has already served. Allowing a seven-month discount in this respect again brings Mr Nottingham’s sentence to a level where the Court is obliged to consider home detention. We consider that to be an appropriate sentence, particularly having regard to:

(a) Mr Nottingham’s physical and mental health, which we consider would make the consequences of imprisonment disproportionately severe;

(b) the opportunity to direct participation in rehabilitative programmes, as recognised by the Judge; and

(c) the ability to protect the interests of the complainants and the community by the imposition of restrictive conditions of internet access, again as recognised and directed by the Judge.

I hope the complainants and other victims are adequately protected.

With no sign of acceptance of responsibility nor remorse I have doubts about the prospects of rehabilitative programmes having much impact.

Our approach is therefore to impose concurrent sentences, as follows:

(a) in respect of the offending against C, 12 months’ home detention, concurrent with all other sentences;

(b) in respect of the offending against T, 12 months’ home detention, concurrent with all other sentences;

(c) in respect of the offending against B, eight months’ home detention, concurrent with all other sentences;

(d) in respect of the offending against H, six months’ home detention, concurrent with all other sentences;

(e) in respect of the offending against M, six months’ home detention, concurrent with all other sentences; and

(f) in respect of each breach of suppression, five months’ home detention concurrent with all other sentences.

The existing (part-served) sentence of home detention is quashed.

A new sentence of 12 months’ home detention (with identified concurrent home detention sentences) plus 100 hours’ community work is imposed, subject to the same conditions as imposed by the District Court.

That’s additional to the three and a half months home detention already served.

I’m aware there are some people who claim to have been badly affected by attacks by Nottingham and his cronies think that prison is deserved, but (and I haven’t been as severely affected) I don’t have a problem with the end sentence, despite him continuing with attacks and harassment while facing the charges this sentence applies to.

However if Nottingham offends again he would deserve what Court should then deal him.

I note that Nottingham tried to get a judge to put me “in prison by Christmas” in 2015 – for (allegedly and incorrectly) enabling people to find his posts at LF. But as with his double standards on name suppression – abusing and breaching it for others but claiming it for himself (as did Cameron Slater), what he wanted to inflict on others was something he tried to weasel out of for himself.

Full judgment: NOTTINGHAM v R [2019] NZCA 344 [30 July 2019]

Dermot Nottingham appeals fail, sentence increased

The original 12 month home detention sentence (three and a half of which has been served) and 100 hours community work has been quashed, and replaced with a new sentence of 12 months home detention presumably beginning from the appeal judgment made last week. He has been banned again from using the Internet for 18 months.

After being charged in 2015 and following numerous delays Dermot Nottingham went to trial last year and was found guilty by a jury of five criminal harassment charges and two breaches of court suppression orders.  He was sentenced in July 2018.

Nottingham appealed both the conviction and sentence, and the Crown also appealed the sentence, claiming it was ‘manifestly inadequate’.  Nottingham has lost both of his appeals, and the sentence has been increased, but again by a judicial whisker he has avoided a prison sentence.

NZ Herald: Blogger’s convictions for ‘malicious and misogynistic attacks’ on former MP, business people stick

Auckland’s Crown Solicitor Brian Dickey said at Nottingham’s sentencing the breaches were an “attack on the High Court”.

Judge Jonathan Down also categorised the breaches as “blatant and contemptuous” and noted Nottingham showed no remorse.

In one instance he sent one of his victims a scene from the Quentin Tarantino film Pulp Fiction, which showed a person being shot in the head.

He can be very nasty, and has attacked many people over the last decade. The charges were laid were deemed representative of the worst examples, but that’s debatable, I have heard claims of despicable attacks (disclosure –  Nottingham has attacked me extensively including trying unsuccessfully to prosecute and imprison me, which was part vindictiveness, part an attempt to concoct a defence for the charges he faced).

All of Nottingham’s harassment victims have been granted permanent name suppression.

The Crown also alleged various other acts of harassment, including “following”, and in one case initiating a private prosecution.

I’m ware of private prosecutions against seven people or companies. These all failed, and after hundreds of thousands of dollars of court costs were awarded against him Nottingham with no attempt made to pay them Nottingham was adjudicated bankrupt in September 2018.

Nottingham, who represented himself, had also called former Whale Oil blogger Cameron Slater to give evidence and argued at his trial that his “articles” were covered by freedom of expression rights.

Slater has also been implicated in making use of the notorious attack website that Nottingham was found to have been the main user of. From his sentencing notes last year “Either Dermot Nottingham is Lauda Finem (in other words, the leading mind of that blog) or he is so intimately related to it that it is proper to conclude that he provided information and draft articles to that blog site knowing and intending that they would be published. He makes the concession…that he has never denied that he has supplied information to the website…” – see “Either Dermot Nottingham is Lauda Finem…or he is so intimately related to it…”

Nottingham and Slater have been associated in a number of legal proceedings (including the attempted prosecution of myself and three others), but others have also been involved and aided and abetted, including his brothers Phillip and Antony, Marc Spring and Earle McKinney.

During his appeal, Nottingham argued his convictions should be quashed because the blog site was based overseas.

“You cannot be a party to a crime that never occurred in an overseas jurisdiction,” he said.

So he didn’t deny attacking and defaming people on the website, he just claimed he was immune from new Zealand law.

However, in his summing-up at the trial, Judge Down said: “Even if the main parts of a crime are committed abroad, if you do something to further that crime, and you have done it in New Zealand, that crime, the whole thing can be prosecuted in New Zealand.”

The Court of Appeal judges, Justice John Wild, Justice Susan Thomas and Justice Matthew Muir, agreed.

“We identify no error in that direction,” they said.

Slater’s “unambiguous position” was it was impossible to do anything online which did not leave “footprints everywhere”, the Court of Appeal decision reads.

Despite this, the Court of Appeal sided with the Crown’s position that the circumstantial evidence relied on was “very strong, if not overwhelming”.

It included text messages and internet history showing Nottingham was trying to obtain and research information about the Dudley case, particularly the names of the defendants.

While a police search of computers Nottingham had access to identified several key court documents, including the judge’s sentencing notes, witness statements and a witness list.

Seven hours before publication of the blog, Nottingham also wrote to the police officer heading the inquiry with the subject line: “Report I Am authoring on the Dudley killing”.

The Court of Appeal said much of the harassment material “could at best be described as virulent opinion with only a tangential connection to anything arguably true”.

In other words, Nottingham attacked people making false accusations and assertions, something I have seen a lot of in emails and court documents.

“As the Crown said in closing, the posts were littered with ‘hate-filled [invective]’ and were strongly misogynistic,” the judges said.

In calculating the sentence the Court of Appeal judges arrived at 31 months’ imprisonment – about 30 per cent higher than Judge Down’s end point.

However, in re-sentencing Nottingham, the trio of judges was “obliged” to take into account the three and a half months of home detention he had already served.

“Allowing a seven-month discount in this respect again brings Mr Nottingham’s sentence to a level where the court is obliged to consider home detention.”

If that had been the original sentence last year Nottingham would have ended up in prison.

The court quashed the existing, part-served, sentence and imposed a new 12 months’ home detention term, plus the 100 hours of community work for the suppression breach.

Nottingham’s special conditions also remained, and include not using any electronic device capable of accessing the internet without prior approval from a probation officer.

I take from this that the new 12 months home detention term begins from last week’s appeal judgment. And I presume there remains a further 6 month Internet ban after that, which would run through to early 2021.

At least this and his bankruptcy (after he took nearly a year to file a statement of affairs he is due to be discharged from bankruptcy on 11 September 2022) should limit his capability to attack and harass people online should also restrict his habit of vexatious litigation.

Nottingham and his gang of online thugs remain unrepentant and a lot of defamatory attack material remains online, but that poses more risks to him than anyone. I think at least one legal proceeding continues against Nottingham for posts done years ago.

Will Nottingham try to appeal this new sentence in the Supreme Court? On past behaviour he may like to try, but the Official Assignee may make that difficult if not impossible. I need to find out, because bizarrely suppression on aspects of the failed case against me continues until his case has reached a final resolution.

When more details are available online in the judgment I will do a post on that.


Many judgments with suppression involved or from the District are not published online, but here is a reference to some of those that are:

Nottingham v Maltese Cat Limited [2019] NZCA 246 (24 June 2019)

That is just back to 2015, Nottingham has a long legal history.

I think in all but one of those Nottingham lost his case.

There is one appeal he won, where a High Court judge supported a District Court judge ruling that Nottingham was in contempt of Court, but due to the judge not following procedures correctly the finding was set aside.

Julian Assange sentenced to 50 weeks imprisonment

Julian Assange has been sentenced  to 50 weeks imprisonment in the UK on charges of skipping bail, which he did by holing up in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London to avoid extradition to Sweden. So he has moved from a virtual prison into a real prison.

Reuters: Julian Assange sentenced to 50 weeks in British jail for skipping bail

WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange was sentenced to 50 weeks in prison by a British court on Wednesday for skipping bail when he holed up in Ecuador’s London embassy for seven years until police dragged him out last month.

The case in Britain arose after Australian-born Assange, 47, was accused by two Swedish women of sexual assault and rape in 2010. Assange fought through the courts to get an extradition order and the preliminary investigation dropped.

Assange sought refuge in the embassy in June 2012 to avoid an extradition order to Sweden.

His lawyer argued it was an act of desperation to avoid being passed to the United States to face action over the release of thousands of secret U.S. diplomatic cables.

But handing down what was nearly the maximum possible sentence, Judge Deborah Taylor told Assange he had exploited his privileged position to flout the law and express his disdain for British justice.

“Whilst you may have had fears as to what may happen to you, nonetheless you had a choice,” Taylor told Assange, dressed in a black jacket and gray sweatshirt, at Southwark Crown Court.

“It is difficult to envisage a more serious example of this offence.”

And Assange still faces the possibility he will be extradited to the US.

Reuters: U.S. extradition request for Julian Assange to be heard on Thursday

A request by the United States to extradite WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange for one of the biggest ever leaks of classified information will be heard by a London court on Thursday.

“Julian Assange will be sentenced at Southwark Crown Court at 1030 tomorrow for ‘violating his bail conditions’ whilst seeking & obtaining political asylum,” WikiLeaks said.

“On Thursday at 10AM there will be a hearing in Westminster Magistrate Court on the US extradition request,” it said.

The U.S. Justice Department said Assange was charged with conspiring with former Army intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning to gain access to a government computer as part of a 2010 leak by WikiLeaks of hundreds of thousands of U.S. military reports about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and American diplomatic communications.

With the defence support he is likely to have this could be a lengthy process.

 

 

 

The first Manafort sentencing

Paul Manafort was sentenced on eight counts including tax and bank fraud in the US yesterday. He received a much lighter sentence than prosecutors had asked for, which was seen by some as some sort of victory, or a defeat for the Mueller inquiry, but it was still substantial. It included:

  • 47 months imprisonment
  • $50,000 fine
  • Must pay $25 million in restitution
  • 3 years of supervised release after his prison term

The Monetary penalties may not be a big deal if Manafort can afford to pay them, but I think the prison sentence is actually substantial and onerous. Especially for someone who has never been in trouble with the law before, nearly four years in prison is a very big deal.

Prison sentence numbers get thrown around these days as if years don’t matter. For someone who has never been there before months in prison would be a big deal, let alone years.

CBS News: Manafort sentenced to under 4 years in prison, far less than prosecutors sought

U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis handed down the sentence in federal court in Virginia Thursday afternoon. He said Manafort committed “undeniably serious” crimes and expressed surprise that he did not “express regret for engaging in wrongful conduct.”

But Ellis also said the government’s recommendation of 19.5 to 24 years behind bars was “unwarranted” and “excessive,” adding that Manafort has “lived an otherwise blameless life.”

Perhaps ‘an otherwise uncaught life’ would be closer to the mark.

An attorney from special counsel Robert Mueller’s office told the court Manafort “failed to accept responsibility and is not remorseful.” In recent weeks Manafort’s legal team had requested a “significantly” lower sentence than the length recommended by prosecutors.

Before learning his fate, Manafort addressed the court, telling Ellis his life is in “shambles” and asking for leniency.

“The last two years have been the most difficult of my lif. To say I am humiliated and ashamed would be a gross understatement.”

After his conviction in Virginia, Manafort struck a plea deal to avoid a second trial on conspiracy charges in Washington, D.C. A federal judge determined in Februaryhe had breached his plea agreement by lying to the government.

Judge T.S. Ellis said Manafort committed “undeniably serious” crimes and expressed surprise that Manafort did not “express regret for engaging in wrongful conduct.”

“You should have remorse for that,” Ellis said.

Some seem to think that celebrations are in order for a relatively light sentence, but while I think Manafort may be relieved, he won’t have much to celebrate about for quite a while. Time already in custody will come off the time left to serve, but it will still be a tough time ahead for him.

Bill Cosby sentenced to prison, counselling for life

After being found guilt of drugging and sexually assaulting a victim Bill Cosby has been sentenced to prison and lifetime counselling. The victim is just one of many woman who have claimed that Cosby assaulted them.

RNZ:  Bill Cosby sentenced to prison for sex assault

Cosby, 81, has also been categorised as a sexually violent predator, meaning he must undergo counselling for life and be listed on the sex offender registry.

At a retrial in April, Cosby was found guilty of three counts of sexual assault for drugging and molesting Andrea Constand in 2004.

Ahead of the sentence, Judge Steven O’Neill designated Cosby a sexually violent predator, despite the defence’s argument that Cosby’s age and blindness mean he is not a threat.

Tuesday’s classification means he will need to register with state police and notify any community he lives in of his sex offender status, as well as undergo mandatory counselling for life.

The actor’s defence team had argued the state’s sex offender law was too severe given Cosby’s age and the fact that he is legally blind.

The comedian was arrested in 2015 and a deadlocked jury resulted in a mistrial in June 2017.

This year’s retrial occurred amid the #MeToo movement that has seen people worldwide come forward to share stories of sexual harassment and assault.

Justice has been served to some extent on an alleged long term serial offender.

Lack of evidence longer sentences deter crime

Do longer prison sentences deter people from committing crimes? Any evidence is lacking.

NZH – The High Court judge’s challenge: Show me the evidence long sentences put people off committing crime

Justice Matthew Palmer told lawyers ahead of sentencing he wanted them to come to court with evidence longer sentences actually had the deterrent effect the law told him to consider.

Days later, defence lawyers came with research showing it didn’t work.

The Crown turned up with nothing.

The sentencing notes of Justice Palmer reflect concern around the lack of evidence in an area which the Sentencing Act 2002 says should be considered when judges consider how long to send people to jail.

It follows research by the Office of the Prime Minister’s Chief Science Adviser this year which studied tough-on-crime laws and found “there is no evidence of the supposed ‘deterrent’ effect of harsher sentences”.

“On the contrary, these political decisions appear to drive up the prison population and put further costs on the taxpayer.”

Annabel Maxwell-Scott, Chevonne Wellington’s lawyer, cited studies show “long sentences are not effective in deterring others or the offenders themselves”.

She produced research showing there was a higher likelihood of repeat offending for drug crimes when someone was sentenced to prison rather than non-prison sentences.

People using drugs are driven by their addictions, so the possibility of being sentenced is unlikely to deter them.

Victoria University criminologist Dr Liam Martin said the theory of deterrence argued along two strands – that the wider community was put off committing crime because of long sentences and that the individual sent to prison did not commit further crime because of the length of sentence.

He said the idea the broader community was dissuaded from criminal offending was impossible to measure.

However, he said there was a large body of evidence showing individuals were not deterred by long sentences and some studies showed those people went on to commit more crime.

However there are obviously non-drug related offences, and also other factors when considering sentences. For example if people are in prison they can’t commit crimes.

First ‘third strike’ maximum sentence

A man has been sentenced to a maximum term (for the charge) of seven years in prison with no parole, for stabbing someone in the leg. If it hadn’t been a third strike offence it would have qualified for a prison sentence in the 2-3 year range.

It is the first time the ‘manifestly unjust’ out clause has not been invoked.

Two previous third strike sentences were not applied because the third convictions were both low end indecent assaults that would not on their own have justified prison sentences (indecent assaults can range in severity a lot).

This explanation of the sentencing gives an idea of the procedure judges go through to arrive at an appropriate sentence. This also shows how the judge has considered the intent of Parliament for three strikes.


Summary of offending

[3] On 4 January 2018, you were drinking alcohol with several associates at the Marton Hotel, where you were living while on bail. There is evidence you had been drinking for seven to eight hours. An argument broke out between you and the victim,
who believed you had stolen his phone. The victim was sitting next to you on a couch. You produced a knife with a retractable blade and stabbed the victim in the leg about 20 cm below his knee. This happened without any warning and produced a wound
approximately 2 cm in length, and 0.5 cm deep, into the victim’s calf muscle, which required medical attention including three sutures.

You were described by police who arrived at the scene as being belligerent, aggressive and intoxicated.

Appropriate sentence but for s 86D

[9] I begin by addressing the sentence I would have given you, if this were not your third-strike offence.

[10] The Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Nuku is the leading sentencing guideline judgment for offences such as wounding with intent to injure. Your offending falls on the cusp of sentencing bands two and three, which means that a starting point between two and three years’ imprisonment is warranted for your offending.

[13] Mr Mallalieu, for the Crown, and Mr Crowley, your counsel, agree that a starting point of around two and a half years’ imprisonment would have been warranted. I am also satisfied that a starting point of two years and six months’ imprisonment would have been appropriate.

[14] You have several previous convictions for violent offending. Most seriously, you were given a sentence of home detention for another instance of wounding with intent to injure in 2012. However, your violent offending has continued, and earlier this year you were sentenced to imprisonment for assault. Mr Crowley accepts that an uplift would have been necessary to reflect your previous convictions. You were also on bail at the time of your offending. I would have considered an uplift of six months appropriate in the circumstances.

[19] As you pleaded guilty, I would have been willing to give you the full 25 per cent discount for entering an early guilty plea.

[20] This would have resulted in an end sentence of two years and three months’ imprisonment. This means that you would have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment, regardless of the three strikes regime.

[21] I will now consider whether it would be manifestly unjust to order that you serve your sentence without parole. I am not convinced that it would be grossly disproportionate to make such an order in your circumstances. Your offending sits in the mid-range of wounding with intent to injure. This is not a case where your offending is insignificant compared to a maximum sentence that was designed to cover a wide variety of behaviour, as was the case in R v Campbell and R v Fitzgerald, both of which concerned indecent assaults that otherwise would not have attracted sentences of imprisonment at all. As I have already noted, absent the three strikes regime, you would have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of two years.

[22] I acknowledge that your sentence will be much harsher than I would otherwise have imposed, however, that will invariably be the case for a third-strike offence. Parliament deliberately designed a harsh response to offenders who persistently commit serious offences despite clear warnings. I have not been presented with any evidence that would suggest you were incapable of understanding the two warning previous given to you in 2012 and 2014.

[23] The Court of Appeal has emphasised that the manifestly unjust exception will only be engaged in clear and convincing cases.
While such cases might not be rare, as many offences encompass a wide variety of behaviour, it would be contrary to Parliament’s intent for the courts to routinely invoke the exception as a matter of course. Some regard must be given to the fact that Parliament anticipated that some degree of disproportion would inevitably be involved in a regime such as this.

[25] I have reached the conclusion that this is not a clear and convincing case to depart from the full effects of the three strikes regime. This conclusion is based in part because I consider that you are at a high-risk of reoffending and there is a need for
community protection. Your previous three strike offences, and the pattern of behaviour they demonstrate, are very telling.

(1) Your first-strike offence was for the same charge as the present offence. You jointly assaulted a victim, along with your father, by repeatedly punching his head and body with closed fists. The victim was also kicked in the face. You also used pieces of wood to strike the victim. The victim suffered a fractured nose, lacerations to his forehead, scalp and one of his fingers, and a fracture to that finger. The victim experienced on-going problems relating to his nose and finger. The
pre-sentence reports for this offence described you as having little insight into the implications of your offending. The sentencing Judge described them as disturbing to read.

(2) Your second-strike offence, while for a different kind of offending, was more serious than your first-strike offence. You followed a 17-year-old girl as she was walking home. She either tripped or was pushed to the ground. You indecently assaulted her and forcibly pulled down her underwear while telling her to calm down. You then forcefully penetrated her genitalia with your finger. She screamed and yelled for help, begging you not to hurt her further. You also threw her cell phone away during the attack. You attempted to remove your pants with one hand while holding her with the other. At this stage, the victim managed to bite your forearm and fortunately, she managed to escape. Your offending had major negative emotional impacts on the victim. The pre-sentence report for this offence described you as reluctant to even discuss the incident. It also concluded there was no evidence of remorse and that you displayed no emotion.

[26] While your previous three strike offences were for different charges, they both share a common feature with your present offending; that is the fact that in every case you instigated the offending without warning. It is equally disturbing that the presentence reports for both of your previous “strike” offences record your lack of remorse and insight into your actions. Thankfully, you now appear to be beginning to understand that you have a problem. Nevertheless, your continued resort to violence while in custody demonstrates that you have not yet fully come to grips with your violent tendencies.

[27] All three of these offences occurred within a period of approximately six and half years. You continued to offend on each occasion shortly after the end of your previous sentence. You did this even after you were warned about the consequences.

[28] In those circumstances, it is fair to say you are at a high-risk of re-offending, which is confirmed by the assessment in the pre-sentence report. There is a clear need to protect the community from you; one of the central purposes of the three strikes regime. For that reason, I do not consider that it would be manifestly unjust to order that you serve your sentence without parole.

[30] I am sentencing you to seven years’ imprisonment.

[31] That sentence will be served without parole.

R v Waitokia 
21 August 2018
[2018] NZHC 2146

ACT: reduced prison sentence for education

Policy announcement: Rewarding self improvement in prisons

“Prisoners should be able to earn a reduction in their overall sentence by successfully completing literacy, numeracy, and driver licensing courses. This would provide an incentive for prisoners to upskill and ready themselves for a normal, non-criminal life outside of prison.”

Stuff: ACT to reward prisoners with reduced sentences for learning to read in prison

Offenders who study basic numeracy and literacy courses in prison should be rewarded with time shaved off their sentences, ACT leader David Seymour says.

Prisoners who entered prison with a higher level of education should also be eligible for incentives if they act as mentors to other prisoners and help them learn.

Seymour announced the policy at the party’s annual conference at Auckland’s Orakei Bay on Saturday, where he told a packed room of about 120 of the party’s rank and file, prisoners needed “positive incentives” to better themselves.

The ACT policy would see prisoners rewarded with a sentence-reduction of up to six weeks per year, for attaining literacy and numeracy skills in line with National standards, as well as driver licensing courses.

So a prisoner on a three-year sentence could earn up to a capped rate of 18 weeks off their time in prison, if they completed courses of sufficient value.

The policy would not apply to the worst violent or sexual offenders, and it would not help white-collar criminals to study diplomas or degrees. ACT was also proposing to cut red tape to make it easier for some volunteers to gain approval to carry out work in prisons.

According to Seymour, 48 per cent of prisoners had been returned to prison in the past four years. Of all prisoners, about 70 per cent had low levels of literacy and numeracy, and of the more-than 10,000 people in prison, 3240 participated in a programme in 2016.

There was no incentive for prisoners to take responsibility for their own success, said Seymour.

And guest speaker at the conference, Mike Williams supports it.

The Howard League for Penal Reform chief executive Mike Williams said it was a welcome policy, that would make a difference.

The league is an organisation that works for a more “humane” prison system, and already runs literacy courses in prisons.

Williams – a former Labour Party president – spoke to the conference about the work of the league and the cases it deals with.

“Our course is 12 weeks [to teach someone to read]. In 90 per cent of cases that works – we have had occasions where it’s taken a lot longer, and once we’ve had to teach the alphabet.”

The league carries out its work with the help of volunteers, and Williams said it could be done relatively cheaply. The chance of a reduced sentence, combined with force of their peers learning to read and work with numbers would “inspire” many prisoners.

“Illiteracy is particularly important to them, but what we know is that every one of them wants to get out of jail. It’s not a motel, they don’t want to be there.

“So the possibility of a shorter sentence is a very strong incentive to improve yourself, and I understand that it’s been tried and proven in California.”

Positive incentives make sense. More education = shorter sentences seems a good idea.

See in brief: ACT will reward self-improvement in prisons

Filipo sentenced

Losi Filipo chose to plead guilty again and was sentenced today.

Stuff: Rugby player Losi Filipo ordered to do counselling under supervision sentence

Filipo’s earlier discharge without conviction on assault charges was overturned after an appeal by police, and he re-appeared on the charges in the High Court at Wellington on Wednesday.

The 18-year-old former Wellington Lions player maintained his guilty plea and asked to be sentenced immediately.

He was sentenced to nine months’ supervision for assaulting four people, including two women, and has been ordered to attend alcohol counselling, and a course on living without violence. 

In court, Justice David Collins had said the stomping on one victim’s head was “a chilling act of violence that could easily have led to his death”.

In the attack in central Wellington in October last year, Filipo grabbed his first victim, Greg Morgan, by the collar, punched him towards his head, knocking him unconscious. While Morgan was on the ground, he stomped on him about four times, causing injuries including concussion, grazing and bruising.

I think this is a reasonable outcome.

Punching someone and knocking them unconscious is bad enough, but then stomping on their head is despicable and very dangerous. and he went on to assault three other people. The original discharge was inadequate.

The judge took a starting point of two years’ jail and discounted for Filipo’s guilty plea, his youth, lack of previous convictions and the efforts he made after the incident with counselling, saving to pay reparation, doing community work and offering to apologise.

It makes sense to keep him out of prison providing he does the course and counselling properly.

There has to be a clear message that mindless violence should have consequences for the perpetrator – it can severely injury or kill victims.

I think that if Filipo offends violently again in the future he should expect a prison sentence.

But Madeleine Chapman at The Spinoff had a different view of the outcome – The conviction of teenager Losi Filipo is nothing to celebrate.

Congratulations, New Zealand. The court of public opinion has outdone any mere judge, delivering a punishment that reeks of knee-jerk outrage and lazy prejudice, writes Madeleine Chapman.

Losi Filipo was today re-sentenced to nine months’ supervision and counselling for assault. After being discharged without conviction earlier this year, the victims spoke out to the media and shared their side of the story. The public were outraged, threatening to boycott Wellington Rugby for allowing Filipo to remain in the programme, and calling for the sentencing to be appealed.

Wellington Rugby buckled, terminating Filipo’s contract, and the sentencing was overturned. Now Filipo has a conviction, no career, and few prospects given his name conjures up feelings of moral outrage, not to mention the google search nightmare which will forever be associated with it. Justice has finally been served, right?

What absolute bullshit.

I think the bullshit is in this article.

I think that Filipo stepped down from his contract. It’s unknown whether he will have a future career in rugby or not.

The original decision was appealed by the police, not the public. A judge considered things knowing there was a lot of public interest, and decided a discharge was the wrong decision.

The purpose of our justice system is to allow those who have in-depth knowledge of a case to make decisions on offenders based on countless mitigating factors. When someone is charged with an offence, they enter into the legal system and some time later, they exit the system with or without a conviction.

In that time, that all important time, a lot of things happen. Trials are undertaken, counsellors are met, references are consulted, and future repercussions are considered. Losi Filipo entered the justice system, went through all the relevant processes, cooperated fully, accepted his fault, committed to restorative justice, and was discharged without conviction.

That should be the end of the story. That is the justice system working.

No it shouldn’t be the end of the story, Sometimes judges get things wrong. That’s why we have an appeal system, so when questionable court decisions are made they can be tested further.

If he had been given nine months’ supervision and ordered to attend counselling the first time through the justice system, Filipo might strangely be in a better position than he is today. Because apparently an assault conviction isn’t as career-ending as his first judge thought.

That contradicts something she said earlier.

The Losi Filipo case has proven that more often than not, outrageous moral high ground comes before reason and way before compassion. A young man committed an offence, expressed remorse, attempted restorative justice, and was given a chance to be a positive influence in society. That same young man is now a convicted criminal, a known hated face and name without any apparent clear purpose in life, for the near future at least.

This is one case the appeal court found that the first judge got wrong, it’s ridiculous to claim “more often than not, outrageous moral high ground comes before reason” based on that alone.

Compassion resulted in Filipo avoiding a prison sentence despite committing a crime that was devoid of compassion.

Congratulations, New Zealand. You got what you wanted.

Yes, the justice system working as it was designed, able to correct things when poor decisions are made by judges, and able to make it clear that dangerous thuggery should not be let go without reasonable consequences.

Delegat case and rushing to judgment

The Police and then the Court took 18 months to charge Nikilas Delegat and process his case through our legal system. They rejected Delegat’s attempts to get name suppression and to get a discharge without conviction.

The resulting sentence has been widely criticised.

Labour MP Stuart Nash wants the Police Minister Judith Collins to intervene – Newstalk ZB: Stuart Nash: Govt should intervene in Delegat case

Labour’s Police spokesman Stuart Nash has called on Police Minister Judith Collins to direct the Crown to appeal the Nikolas Delegat sentence.

Nash said the Government should tell the Crown Law Office to appeal the “ridiculously light” sentence handed down to Nikolas Delegat for the assault.

Nash wants Ms Collins to speak publicly about the sentence, given her strong comments about assaults on police in 2010.

But…

…Ms Collins said she could not comment on the Delegat case because it was a judicial decision which was still within the period in which an appeal could be lodged.

“I’m not going to pre-empt that. That would be to interfere in the operation of the courts, it would be a breach of the Cabinet manual and could, in fact, completely stuff up any appeal rights that the Crown might have.”

As I understand things Collins is right and Nash should now how our judicial system works and how the Government should not interfere in the process, at least not unless exception circumstances are involved and certainly not if an opposition MP rushes in and grandstands straight after a sentence is announced.

Today’s Herald editorial: Delegat case – system must resist rush to judgment

The sentence given to Nikolas Delegat for assaulting a policewoman has been widely condemned.

An alcohol-fuelled Delegat hit Kane at least four times on March 26 last year. In the same incident, Delegat attacked a security guard at the University of Otago campus and lashed out at arresting police officers. He first appeared in court five days after the attack when he was charged with the aggravated assault of Kane, an offence carrying a maximum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment.

The Appeal Court dismissed Delegat’s suppression case last November and the case went back to the Dunedin District Court in June, when the aggravated assault charge was downgraded to assaulting a police officer with intent to obstruct her in the execution of her duty. The offence carries a three-year jail term.

Delegat admitted the charge but this week Judge Kevin Phillips rejected his plea for a discharge without conviction for what he termed “a very serious assault”. The judge also was critical of Delegat’s approach to a restorative justice conference, saying the teenager had 18 months to do something about it.

The response has been widespread and vocal.

Critics of the sentence complain it is too light. Greg O’Connor, president of the Police Association, said if Delegat had been poor and brown and from South Auckland, he would have gone to jail. Labour MP Stuart Nash wants Crown Law to appeal the judgment.

But…

Delegat is a first offender, and his sentence does not appear out of line, whatever the Police Association might have to say. Critics of the sentence were not present for the hearing, and do not possess all the facts. It is appropriate that decisions of the courts get public scrutiny. It is just as appropriate that the system resists any rush to judgment.

Delegat may appeal, and the Crown may appeal. These things take longer than a reactive social media and grandstanding politicians.

Whether the sentence was appropriate or not is up for the parties involved to consider and accept or oppose as they see fit, through the Court, not through the cauldron of public and political opinion.

Lawyer Graeme Edgeler responded to some of the reactions.

Newshub: Why was Delegat’s sentence so much lighter than Maikuku’s?

Because if it was the same, he’d have gotten 50% more than the maximum penalty for the charge he faced?

What sentence should a 1st time offender get if they plead guilty to an offence carrying a 6 month maximum sentence?

  • 9 months’ prison
  • something else

NZ Herald: Police Association: If Nikolas Delegat were poorer he would have received a harsher sentence

If he were poorer, he probably wouldn’t have made the news.